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NO. 46122-2018
GEM COUNTY NO. CR-2017-491

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After Robert Pratt pled guilty to lewd conduct and sexual battery, the district court
sentenced him to life in prison, with ten years fixed. Mr. Pratt then moved for reconsideration of
his sentence under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”). The district court denied his motion.
Mr. Pratt appeals, asserting the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence and denying his Rule 35 motion.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In May 2017, the State charged Mr. Pratt with three counts of lewd conduct, three counts
of sexual battery, and one count of failure to report abuse. (R., pp.44–47.) The alleged victims
1

were two teenage girls in Mr. Pratt and his wife’s foster care.1 (Presentence Investigation Report
(“PSI”),2 p.50.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Pratt pled guilty to one count of lewd conduct
and one count of sexual battery. (R., pp.99–100, 102–03 (Amended Information); Tr.,3 p.5 (p.11,
L.18–p.13, L.16).) As part of the plea agreement, the State dismissed not only the remaining
charges, but also five charges of sexual exploitation of a minor in a separate Ada County case.
(See PSI, p.53.) In addition, in a separate Canyon County case, Mr. Pratt was found guilty of
twenty counts of sexual exploitation of a child and sentenced to ten years, with six years fixed.
(PSI, pp.53–54; R., p.141 (Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Defendant’s Rule 35
Motion, p.2 n.1).)
In April 2018, the district court held a sentencing hearing in the instant case. (See
R., pp.119–20.) The State recommended a sentence of sixteen years, with six years fixed.
(Tr., p.21, Ls.9–10.) Mr. Pratt requested a sentence of twelve years, with six years fixed.
(Tr., p.26, L.21–p.27, L.4, p.27, Ls.11–13.) The district court exceeded these recommendations
and sentenced Mr. Pratt to life imprisonment, with ten years fixed. (Tr., p.32, Ls.16–23.) In its
sentencing decision, the district court stated:
You, sir, in some ways you look like a good citizen. You served honorably for
your country in the military, in combat zones. Until these recent convictions, you
have no felony convictions. And I recognize that and have considered that.
But you have left in your wake injured and damaged people, young ladies who
had other problems going on in their lives necessitating the removal and
1

Mr. Pratt and his wife are now divorced. (PSI, p.11.)
Citations to the PSI refer to the eighty-two-page electronic document containing the
confidential documents.
3
There is only one 36-page transcript on appeal, and it contains the entry of plea and sentencing
hearing. However, the sentencing hearing portion of the transcript does not provide internal
pagination. For citation purposes, citations to the entry of plea hearing will refer first to the page
number of the entire transcript and then to the internal pagination and line number. For the
sentencing hearing, citations will refer to the page number of the entire transcript and line
number.
2

2

placement with you. You applied as a foster parent. I think at the time you applied
you probably considered that this would give you a chance for abuse because
your request was for teenager [sic] girls to be placed with you. You were in a
position of authority over those girls. You were in a position of providing them
trust and had a moral and legal obligation to care for them. You neglected to do
all of those things. In fact, you did the opposite. You took young ladies who were
going through other problems in their life and submitted them to long-term sexual
abuse.
(Tr., p.30, L.14–p.31, L.3 (emphasis added).) Later on, the district court stated:
Your breach of the trust that was placed on you, Mr. Pratt, your breach of the
power you had in a position of authority, and your legal requirement to care for
these young girls, plus your prior conviction on the child pornography
demonstrate to me that a significant and substantial sentence needs to be imposed
to meet the sentencing goals that I am trusted to try to achieve.
(Tr., p.32, Ls.2–9.) On April 12, 2018, the district court issued the judgment of conviction.
(R., pp.121–22.) Mr. Pratt timely appealed. (Aug. R., pp.2–3.)
On April 26, 2018, the State moved to correct the record. (R., pp.126–27.) The State
explained that there was no support in the record for the district court’s statement: “You applied
as a foster parent. I think at the time you applied you probably considered that this would give
you a chance for abuse because your request was for teenager [sic] girls to be placed with you.”
(R., p.126; Tr., p.30, Ls.17–21.4) The State noted that the PSI stated, “[Mr. Pratt] said he wanted
to specify in teenagers because they are hard to place and explained that they weren’t allowed to
have males because of their two (2) young daughters.” (R., p.126; PSI, p.58.) The State also
informed the district court:
In the Idaho Health and Welfare Resource Family Foster/Adopt Home Study
dated July 1, 2015, the social worker preparing the study states that “. . .it is the
recommendation of this licensing worker that Bailey Fraker and Robert Pratt be
4

The State’s recitation of the district court’s statement varies slightly from the transcript of the
sentencing proceeding. The State quoted the district court as stating: “You applied as a foster
parent. I think at the time you applied you considered that this would give you a chance for abuse
because your request was for teenage girls to be placed with you.” (R., p.126.) Quotations to the
district court’s statement herein will rely on the language from the transcript.
3

licensed as foster parents to care for two children, male or female, birth to
eighteen (0-18) years old, in the State of Idaho. Robert and Bailey’s current age
preference is 7-18. It is also the recommendation of this worker that Bailey Fraker
and Robert Pratt be considered adoption candidates for two children, male or
female, ages 0-18.” State’s Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery,
filed October 5, 2017, page 288.
(R., p.127.) The State requested that the district court correct the record of the sentencing
proceeding and “that reliance on any information that is not supported by the record of this
proceeding by the Court in pronouncing sentence be reviewed and corrected.” (R., p.127.)
On August 7, 2018, Mr. Pratt filed a Rule 35 motion to reduce his sentence. (R., pp.131–
33.) He argued there was no support in the record for the district court’s finding at sentencing
that Mr. Pratt “intentionally set out to commit his crime with forethought.” (R., p.131.) He
further explained:
Mr. Pratt never
- - requested teenage female children. Rather, his response in the PSI
report at page 12 was meant to explain the evidence in the record, which is that it
was the Department of Health and Welfare’s decision (and not Mr. Pratt’s) that
their home would be best suited for teenage female foster children; and the
Department’s decision was based – not on Mr. Pratt’s requests – but on the simple
fact that Mr. Pratt and his wife already had two very young female children living
in their home.
(R., p.132 (underline in original).) In addition to this information, Mr. Pratt argued the
psychosexual evaluation (“PSE”) contained no indication he “sought out his victims.”
(R., p.132.) Based on this information, Mr. Pratt requested the district court revisit its sentencing
decision “to recognize that Mr. Pratt did not seek out his victims, and to adjust his sentence
accordingly.” (R., p.133.)
The district court denied Mr. Pratt’s Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.140–42.) The district court
explained:
Here, Mr. Pratt does not dispute the legality of his sentence, and thus, his
motion is a plea for leniency. In his motion, Pratt references the sentencing
hearing, where the Court stated Pratt “intentionally set out to commit his crime
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with forethought” and pointed to Pratt’s subsequent attempt to correct the
statement in his Motion to Correct Record,5 arguing there is no support for that
position.
Second, Pratt argues that contrary to the Court’s statements, he never
requested females while applying to become a foster parent. Pratt contends that
both he and his wife were open to any gender foster child, and that it was the State
who placed them with females because the Pratts already had two daughters. Pratt
also argues that the psychosexual evaluation does not indicate that Pratt sought
out his victims, and that Pratt expressed guilt, remorse for the girls, and
acknowledged he needed help for his behavior. While the Court agrees that
remorse and acknowledgement are important, it is unpersuaded by his plea and
does not feel that a reduction in the ﬁxed portion of his sentence is justiﬁed.
The Court reviewed the record, the brieﬁng, and the facts and
circumstances of the case. Pratt was charged with—and pleaded guilty to—crimes
involving inappropriate relationships and frequent sexual contact between a
thirty-year-old man and vulnerable thirteen and sixteen-year-old girls placed in
his care as foster children.
The Court extensively covered the sentencing goals at the sentencing
hearing regarding protection of society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and
punishment. Pratt’s PSI and psychosexual evaluation presented Pratt with a
moderate risk to re-offend and moderately amenable to treatment. The Court also
considered Pratt’s criminal history, including the Canyon County case where Pratt
was found guilty of 20 counts of exploitation after ﬁnding over 1,000 images 0f
child pornography on equipment owned by Pratt.
After careful review, the Court can only conclude that Pratt’s sentence was
appropriate at the time of sentencing and remains so as of the date of this Order.
(R., pp.142–43.)
ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed an excessive sentence of life
imprisonment, with ten years fixed, upon Mr. Pratt, following his guilty plea to lewd
conduct and sexual battery?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Pratt’s Rule 35 motion?

5

The district court stated that Mr. Pratt moved to correct the record; however, the State, not
Mr. Pratt, moved to correct the record. (R., pp.126–27.)
5

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed An Excessive Sentence Of Life
Imprisonment, With Ten Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Pratt, Following His Guilty Plea To Lewd
Conduct And Sexual Battery
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Mr. Pratt’s aggregate sentence does not exceed the
statutory maximum. See I.C. §§ 18-1508 (maximum of life for lewd conduct), -1508A(4)
(maximum of life for sexual battery under I.C. § 18-1508(1)(a)). Accordingly, to show that the
sentence imposed was unreasonable, Mr. Pratt “must show that the sentence, in light of the
governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137
Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
When considering whether the trial court abused its discretion, this Court
considers: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion
and consistently with the legal standards applicable; and (3) whether the trial
court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8 (2016). Factual findings, including whether a certain factor is a
mitigating or aggravating circumstance, will be upheld if supported by substantial and competent
evidence. State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 788–89 (1997).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
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the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
Here, Mr. Pratt asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, he contends the district court
should have sentenced him to a lesser term of imprisonment in light of the mitigating factors,
including the fact that he did not specifically request to foster teenage girls, his acceptance of
responsibility and remorse, lack of a prior criminal record, and military service.
As an initial matter, Mr. Pratt maintains the district court abused its discretion by relying
upon a clearly erroneous factual finding in its consideration of a key aggravating circumstance.
The district court explicitly noted Mr. Pratt “applied as a foster parent” and, “at the time” he
applied, he “probably considered that this would give you a chance for abuse because your
request was for teenager [sic] girls to be placed with you.” (Tr., p.30, Ls.17–21.) The PSI,
however, did not support the district court’s factual finding. The PSI stated:
According to Mr. Pratt, he and Bailey Fraker became foster parents in
2015 and were licensed to care for children of all ages but not handicapped
children due to their residence having stairs. He said he wanted to specify in
teenagers because they are hard to place and explained that they weren’t allowed
to have males because of their two (2) young daughters. The defendant said he
chose to be a foster parent after the reported bad experience he had with CPS
when he was in second grade.6
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Growing up, Mr. Pratt was physically and emotionally abused by his father. (PSI, pp.11, 56.)
Mr. Pratt and his brothers lived in a state of fear. (PSI, p.56.) His father also left pornographic
images on display at their home. (PSI, p.55.) The bad experience with CPS (Child Protection
Services) in second grade occurred when CPS was contacted after Mr. Pratt was severely beaten
by his father. (PSI, p.56.) Mr. Pratt reported that the CPS did not help, but rather returned him
7

(PSI, p.59.) As shown above, the PSI did not state Mr. Pratt requested teenage girls. The PSI
stated, at best, Mr. Pratt requested teenagers and Idaho Health and Welfare did not allow
Mr. Pratt and his wife to foster males. This is simply not a request by Mr. Pratt to foster teenage
girls in order to abuse them. The district court’s finding of such a request was not supported by
substantial and competent evidence. The district court thus relied upon a clearly erroneous
factual finding in its sentencing decision. Based upon this erroneous factual finding alone, the
district court did not reach its sentencing by an exercise of reason. Rather, the district court’s
sentencing decision was unreasonable because it was based in large part upon the district court’s
incorrect determination of a significant aggravating circumstance: that Mr. Pratt intentionally
requested to foster teenager girls in order to abuse them. Because the district court relied upon an
aggravating circumstance that was not present in this case, the district court did not reach its
decision by an exercise of reason and therefore abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence of life in prison, with ten years fixed.
Looking at the other mitigating factors in this case, Mr. Pratt maintains the district court
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence. First, Mr. Pratt accepted responsibility
and expressed remorse for his actions. Acceptance of responsibility, remorse, and regret are all
factors in favor of mitigation. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). In the PSI, Mr. Pratt
stated he would “carry the guilty for my actions for the rest of my life.” (PSI, p.64.) The PSE
determined, although he was a moderate risk to reoffend, he was also moderately amenable to
treatment. (PSI, pp.30, 33, 35–36.) In addition, Mr. Pratt expressed remorse and acceptance at
the sentencing hearing. He stated:

home to his father to “teach him to stop lying.” (PSI, p.56.) At age ten, Mr. Pratt’s mother and
father got divorced, and Mr. Pratt lived with his mother. (PSI, p.56; Aug. R., p.1.)
8

I’d like to first thank the Court for allowing for the best possible defense
that Mr. Taylor has worked on so hard. My recent actions have been motivated to
prevent further harm, pain, and suffering of [M.] and [S.] Not a day goes by that I
am not haunted by that image. I pray every day that they live in peace. It is my
hope that my recent actions help to facilitate that peace and to prevent any further
suffering. I cannot ask for forgiveness for my past actions. The depth of my
remorse is immeasurable. I will have to live with my decisions for the rest of my
life, and it is extremely important that both [M.] and [S.] know that they are not in
any way responsible for this situation. I am truly sorry for any and all pain my
past actions have caused to all that are involved. Thank you.
(Tr., p.28, Ls.1–17.) Mr. Pratt’s acceptance of responsibility and remorse support a more lenient
sentence.
Additionally, the absence of any prior convictions supports a lesser sentence for
Mr. Pratt. “The absence of a criminal record is a mitigating factor that courts consider.” State v.
Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 836 (2011). “It has long been recognized that ‘[t]he first offender should
be accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal.” State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670,
673 (Ct. App. 1998) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982)).
Here, Mr. Pratt has only one prior withheld judgment for a misdemeanor offense. (PSI, p.52.)
The lack of any criminal convictions stands in favor of mitigation.
Lastly, Mr. Pratt’s military service supports a more lenient sentence. A defendant's prior
military service is a recognized mitigating factor. Nice, 103 Idaho at 91. Here, Mr. Pratt’s stepfather was in the Army, and he inspired Mr. Pratt to join the military as well. (R., p.56; Aug.
R., p.1.) Mr. Pratt was in the Army for seven years. (PSI, pp.60–61.) He was deployed to Iraq for
nine months. (PSI, pp.60–61.) While overseas, he was shot in his body armor and experienced
numerous explosions. (PSI, p.61; Aug. R., p.1.) Mr. Pratt’s mother explained that, after Mr. Pratt
returned home, he “seemed different,” and she believed “Iraq changed him.” (Aug. R., p.1.) She
knew, however, that “deep down” he was still the same person and “wants to do the right thing.”
(Aug. R., p.1.) Mr. Pratt’s military service supports a lesser sentence.
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In summary, the district court did not reach its decision by an exercise of reason because
it relied on a clearly erroneous factual finding in its consideration of the aggravating
circumstances in this case. Further, the district court failed to give adequate weight to the
mitigating circumstances in this case. Considering the mitigating factors, and the correct factual
finding on Mr. Pratt’s foster care request, Mr. Pratt argues the district court abused its discretion
by imposing an excessive sentence of life imprisonment, with ten years fixed.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Pratt’s Rule 35 Motion
“A Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence is essentially a plea for leniency, addressed
to the sound discretion of the court.” State v. Carter, 157 Idaho 900, 903 (Ct. App. 2014). In
reviewing the grant or denial of a Rule 35 motion, the Court must “consider the entire record and
apply the same criteria used for determining the reasonableness of the original sentence.” Id. The
Court “conduct[s] an independent review of the record, having regard for the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest.” State v. Burdett,
134 Idaho 271, 276 (Ct. App. 2000). “Where an appeal is taken from an order refusing to reduce
a sentence under Rule 35,” the Court’s scope of review “includes all information submitted at the
original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to reduce.” State v.
Araiza, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985). “When presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant
must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
203 (2007).
In this case, Mr. Pratt provided new and additional information to the district court in
support of his Rule 35 motion. Specifically, Mr. Pratt asked the district court to reconsider its
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sentencing decision in light of the corrected information on his alleged request to foster teenage
girls. The State and Mr. Pratt both informed the district court of the correct information—
Mr. Pratt did not request to foster teenage girls. (R., pp.126–27, 131–33.) The district court,
however, did not explicitly state that it was considering the corrected information in its order
denying Mr. Pratt’s Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.142–43.) Nor did the district court explain how the
removal of this aggravating circumstance affected its sentencing decision. (R., pp.142–43.)
Mr. Pratt argues that the removal of this aggravating circumstance, which was a significant factor
at sentencing, supported a reduction in his sentence pursuant to Rule 35. The district court did
not reach its denial of the Rule 35 motion by an exercise of reason because it failed to give
sufficient weight, if any, to the elimination of a key aggravating factor in the case. As such,
Mr. Pratt maintains the district court abuse its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion. He
submits the district court should have reduced his sentence in light of the new, corrected
information.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Pratt respectfully requests this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
Alternatively, he respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand
his case to the district court for a new sentencing hearing. In the alternative, he respectfully
requests this Court vacate the district court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion and remand his
case to district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 28th day of November, 2018.

/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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